Perceptual biases and animal illusions: a response to comments on Kelley and Kelley
Can animals create illusions? What are they used for? What can they tell us about the evolution of signaling traits and receiver perception? These are just some of the questions that we have attempted to address in our recent review of animal illusions and other forms of sensory deception . Although it is always potentially risky to suggest an umbrella term such as "animal illusion" to describe signals/traits with a diverse range of functions and perceptual mechanisms, we hope that our review stimulates behavioral ecologists to reconsider the important role of perception in both natural and sexual selection.
That selection might act on animal perception is not a novel suggestion, and significant advances have been made by considering the role of the "psychological landscape" (Guilford and Dawkins 1991) in sensory bias (Ryan et al. 1990; Endler 1992) , sensory traps (Christy 1995) , mimicry (Wickler 1968) , and perceptual biases (Schaefer and Ruxton 2009; Ryan and Cummings 2013) . The key question is how do animal visual illusions fit into these models of signal evolution (Théry 2014) ? This is a difficult question to answer and is one of the reasons that we presented a continuum of examples of sensory manipulation, in addition to those that might be illusory. We hope that this general approach will kick-start the debate as to what does and does not constitute an illusion. Nonetheless, we suggest that animal illusions can be considered part of a broad model that describes the importance of perceptual biases in shaping the evolution of animal traits (Ryan 2014) . Illusions can exploit perceptual biases, manipulate mechanisms of perceptual processing, and enforce errors of perception. Importantly, animal illusions may not only enhance the efficacy of sexual signals (making illusions difficult to distinguish from comparative mate choice), but they should also act to exploit perceptual processes in other contexts, such as natural selection.
Although there has been a recent resurgence in the field of protective coloration and significant advances have been made in modeling animal visual systems, the underlying processes of pattern perception have scarcely been considered (Merilaita 2014) . Stevens' (2014) suggestion that disruptive coloration cannot be considered an illusion because it primarily relies on preventing detection highlights the importance of considering the different levels of sensory processing that are involved in detecting and recognizing prey (Troscianko et al. 2009 ). For example, differential blending is a form of disruptive coloration where some elements of the prey's coloration are highly contrasting, while other color patches blend into the background (Cott 1940; Stevens and Merilaita 2009 ). This form of coloration might be considered illusory because it disrupts predators' perceptual grouping mechanisms so that some patches of the prey's body are more likely to be grouped with the background rather than with the adjacent color patches (Espinosa and Cuthill 2014) . Object detection and identification therefore requires several levels of sensory processing involving both low-level edge detection neurons and higher level stages that use perceptual grouping to resolve border ownership (Troscianko et al. 2009 ).
Although we have suggested a broad working definition of animal illusions, several of the invited commentaries (Kemp and White 2014; Stevens 2014) rightly point out that the field can only progress if a clear empirical framework is presented. In the human literature, illusions are often classified according to their appearance or cause but have been liable to change as theoretical understanding progresses. Gregory (1997) suggested 4 types of illusion based on analogous errors of language: fiction (e.g., Kanizsa triangle), paradox (e.g., Penrose stairs), ambiguity (e.g., Necker cube), and distortion (e.g., Müller-Lyer lines). Two further categories have since been added (Gregory 2009 ): blindness (e.g., attentional deficiencies) and instability (e.g., op art). This approach is likely to present significant challenges given the interspecific variability observed in animals and the lack of knowledge concerning the mechanisms involved. Perhaps a simpler categorization of different types of illusion may provide a way forward. In our review, we classified illusions based on their putative perceptual effects (Coren and Girgus 1978) although it may be difficult to elucidate perceptual outcomes in nonhuman animals and 1 illusion may induce multiple perceptual outcomes (Kelley and Endler 2012) . It is also worth noting that traits themselves may not necessarily be illusory-rather the context in which they are presented acts to distort perception of the trait (e.g., assimilation illusion). This suggests that it is important to consider how a trait is perceived in different social and environmental contexts; furthermore, the previous perceptual experience (i.e., working knowledge of the world) of the receiver may be important. In particular, future research requires guidelines for quantifying animal perception in an ecologically relevant setting using natural visual scenes. Moving forward, it is crucial that behavioral ecologists collaborate closely with cognitive neuroscientists to further understand the processes that create subjective perceptual worlds.
